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Shadows were heaving, their black liquid-flesh interlocking to rip apart. The wind had finally smothered the candle he kept on, as it screeched like some delirious wayward traveller. Whatever it was entered the house again; the shadow of a tree branch lighting cracks on my face, its shape the long hand of something other. It would start again, clawing at the flesh-threads of life with which I held onto Clara, the same way I held onto Damascus the responsible elder, Isabella ‘Bella’ and Rebecca ‘Becca’, the rivalling twins, Ruth the one we were sure would make it, and sweet little Elijah, before they were all torn off, leaving my womb in clustered, disconnected, burning threads. And when Clara lay instead in my palm, just a small, swollen, deep-purple body, dripping still with the thick black blood I lifted her from, the unseen hand kept teething at my womb while I breathed harder meaning to stay still. When Darius returned with a relighted candle, its light was soon stifled again, so the blue light rose on his face as he entered, “Petra… Petra I’ve been meaning to tell you that-” “Tell it.” “That… I can’t look after you anymore,” “Bastard.” “No, not when I knew the whole time that you put something in my drink to keep me here. I knew it, and I didn’t say, so as not to make you feel uncomfortable. And in all this waste of time, I tried to have you understand, that you didn’t need to. I would’ve wanted to stay anyway.” “And now?” “…Well, I did my best.” That’s when I put Clara’s body to rest in the glass jar I had beside me, before standing, striding over, and striking him. His hand covered the side of his face from which his nose trickled blue-black in that decadent night, and for the first time, I attempted to caress the smooth unwavering face. Still, he turned and silently moved down the narrow stairs towards the entrance. His shoes dragged in the murky waters. The door creaked long and hollow as he left our house, into the warring downpour. Equally drenched after rushing barefooted to the balcony, I watched him wading far in the rippling silver street, trying to make him think, I should go back, I should go back, I should go back, or else I’m a lowly bastard , all the way up until he finally infused with the night.   ***   Someone gashed a red-orange wound in that sky, and under its pervading glow I hoped for warmth, only to get sore in the bright metallic air. When I briefly retreated inside, to bring Clara to see the view, her jar had shattered and her flimsy body furred over by the carpet dust. And I went to wash her, crying ugly and sputtering mucus, explaining that I never meant to drop her and that she was never dropped anyway, that the bath was only to celebrate her living. And as I washed her, a part of my nail slipped, a slit in her warm flesh. And in silence, I pushed a scream like my throat could churn diamonds, while her limp body trembled along with my trembling hand. Holding her with dedication I returned to the balcony to say, look Clara, this is the light, and I heard her crying with that raspy newborn wail, so I spilt, I love you Clara, I love you and all your brothers and sisters, I loved you as much as I loved Darius … I had to end the crying, knowing what would come. So I carried her with me outside, to the bridge over the canal, where its green-blue waters received her in silence. My jaw and all my muscles were taut as I dug my nails into my scalp and dragged down the sides of my hot face with its temples burning. For a moment I knelt and laid my head against the stone barrier, gripping the bars of the bridge to imagine my nails biting into Darius again. But what good is a life in a glass jar? It’s not my fault. None of them. Soon after I rushed back home, as people began to wake in theirs, and the song of minor birds recalled, and so did the distant pair of wheels. Slouching in the two chairs he first laid on, I stared at the cold lute in its corner while it stared back at me. We faced away from the light, as the shadows grew longer and darker and taller than I ever was or could’ve been. With no reason to be awake, I felt my mind slip through the numb fingers interweaved in my scalp as the shadows began silently twisting and writhing into little boys and girls.   ***   In some ways, it was worse that I could watch them play and play with them, but fail to clasp my arms around any one of the waiting children. Because children need hugging. And what a child also needs, is to be seen. But I couldn’t see them. They were still just the cold hollow of light, always shivering. And I couldn’t warm them with a hug. So I kept many candles lighted. Soon the chance to see them came, when on Carnevale, ships arrived from the world to celebrate, and under the freedom of my mask and the carelessness of some inadequate mothers and fathers, I found them. I guided them by their little pink hands, warm and fleshy, through the trembling flood of embroidered ballgowns and heeled boots with the golden buckles, out of the whipping light and back to our damp home, which in their absence had begun to eat away at itself, where I then removed their masks with the same dedication in which I first carried their bodies. Damascus, Bella, Becca, Ruth, Elijah and Clara all stood before me, watching while I knelt to meet them at eye level. And I embraced them all, exhaling, we’re finally home, then crying, this is home . And exactly as I had known them, they were all very beautiful children.   *** It was necessary for me to horde them away first. Otherwise, I would’ve lost them again too soon. So when the flood had crept in and swallowed back out enough times, we all stepped into the nipping air, holding hands tight. As we moved through the cobblestone street my vision blurred with the constant straining of my neck head and spine, to look more ways at a time than my useless body would allow. I knew that anyone could assume I was as negligent, no, more negligent, incompetent, horrible, than whoever came before, yet I walked the dignity of a thousand noble women and trained myself to hold the same severity of the overseers, that with the triumph of a family I presented, I began to remind myself that the past should never be seen. And so I proudly toured the children around the Bridge of Sighs, the Basilica, the Palace, then the square, no musicians that time. The empty space soon filled with the memories I poured into the children, of a strange man made of rock, with the exaggerated limbs and raw skill of aggravation that a wiry mosquito would possess. As I spoke further, Damascus held my hand looking sorry for me, Bella and Becca started to tug at each other’s hair and skirts, Ruth crouched to closely inspect the approaching myriad of white, blue, brown, pigeons, Elijah kept finding things to laugh about, and Clara poked my arm to ask, with her beaming ruddy face, and fingers coyly intertwining, whether the man I told them about was my “sweet one”, to which Damascus quickly shook his head, ordered her to “shush!”.   As I was about to correct him, and answer her, a man who had been sitting on the steps of one of the stone buildings surrounding us, stood up to make his way. The heavy sun poured onto his back so that he was overcast for some time, and all the while I hardened my nerves and firmed my teeth, as I commanded the children to gather behind. Yet the man, when we were finally close enough, had been the red-eyed, dishevelled, gaunt-looking remains of the skin he wore before, like a scrap of leather worn too often, with white scratches visible in the tarnished brown. And it was easier then, to admit that I loved him.   *** “Petra…” The rain of many nights before clung to him in the crevices of his weary joints. As I laid my head by his neck, the damp musk seemed to weigh on me too, and the rough cloth on his chest and back drained my warmth as I held on. Then with a slight tightening, and under a whisper, I told him, “Again.” And Darius breathed it out, before floating to the ground, and I descended with him to support his weight, to watch his half-lidded eyes close further. After they were fully closed, he went on, “I heard, that you became a recluse, and it wasn’t enough just to hear about you. But on my way back, to our home, I couldn’t continue. Instead, I wasted away here, afraid, to see all the damage I left. I’m sorry…”, and he turned his heavy head away from the sun, using his wide palms to cover the abysmal sight of him crying in my lap. “And Petra, I always knew you were a beautiful soul. The way you’ve taken these children in-” “Taken them in?”, I interjected. After he raised his brows, observing the children who gathered in a crescent shape around us, he sighed with a confused expression, “…Well, alright, beautiful Signorina. You tell me.” So I ensured he knew that their true mother was me, that these were our destined children, Damascus, Bella and Becca, Ruth, Elijah, Clara, all as they were meant to be. And to that he sat up on the step below mine, to kiss my hand, say nothing more, stare into the distance and sooth his thumbs over my upturned palm, us sitting all together on the big stone steps to face the sun.   ***   When the sun finally froze over, hardened and white and fading into its equally pallid sky, the pieces could be seen descending on the cobblestones, infusing into the fog that settled over the darkening waters, and blanketing the curved domes and tiled roofs of all great and humble buildings within view of our balcony. With the glass door closed behind me the children still slept, scattered with their pink and peachy limbs in disarray all over the dishevelled bed, cushions and blankets spilled onto the carpet from its sides. With Elijah and Clara on opposite sides about to fall, I opened the door; cool air entered with me, smothered the candlelight Darius had left for them the night before his return to work. And I knew there would still be much time before he could reappear, but I would sit every morning until then, to form his impressive silhouette, approaching from the expanding fog. After re-arranging and re-blanketing the children, the church bell rang, followed by the airy white notes of its choir. That was when the door resounded from below. And I gathered my long velvet skirt in one hand to carefully descend the stairs. Yet when I answered, a dark child stood silent before me, with big black eyes staring under sparse brows, a wrinkly finger lightly itching its flat nose, and wild blue-black hair protruding from its ugly high forehead. With its bare clothing and lack of shoes, I could have pitied it. I would have pitied it, if it weren’t that child. Something there sickened me and compelled me to slam the door. But as I retreated up the stairs, the door resounded heavily again. So I rushed back to scream at that disturbingly silent pest, to leave me and my children in peace, before slamming the door again, leaning against it and making myself breathe slow. Needing to lay in the warmth of my sleeping children, I made my way upstairs.   ***   “If I could kill that child I would”. She exhaled the words like a white death. Her eyes took in the children’s cooling bodies and their calm expressions surrounding her. I tried holding my breath longer but lost hold, and the covers were ripped from the mirrors to expose me to the light, her face stretched into disgust and rage as we took the beating that came, every fist a blooming warm.   Once she finally tired, I rushed to hang my arms around her, nestle my head by her heaving chest, to stop her for as long as possible. And I saw the woman’s arms bear the same bruises as mine, before I looked up to her melting, seething face. Her chest swells again when she knows. And I think our resemblance only hurts her more.   ***   The child still remains. I look away, but the mirrors latch on to me with my reflection, forcing me to see her again, myself before the world of beauty. In weary confusion, I stand still, slowly turning my head to mourn everything before us, a ghostly sheen descending like the holy spirit transforming into something real, washing over all the horrors under its vague light, and to the sound of nothing but the breathing canal, we wait for Darius to return home.

The extent to which China may be considered a status quo power can only be determined by classifying the term itself. Where definitions vary, the consistent meaning is this: a single force, whether consisting of an individual nation or combined nations but primarily the former, that is both perceived and confirmed as having the final say in all matters. This could be due to moral superiority, material wealth and resources, intimidation, or sheer expanse, whether through allyship or by force. In the case of China, while previously accepted superpower nations such as the US face an economic and structural decline at the same time that China experiences an industrial rise, news articles are naïve to recrown status quo power to the CCP [1] . This is because, while it has indeed amassed an impressive scale of power in several realms, allowing it to have the final say in many global decisions, it still lacks the recognition of being such a power from a more constructivist lens due to issues with soft diplomacy [2] . Consequently, later attempts to rebrand its image through foreign aid can only fall through. Yet on a more individual level, cultural integration via social media platforms have helped to support the country’s image. Although this is still a relatively small scale of acceptance unlikely to reach the support necessary to override its soft power failures. Therefore, despite following the expected steps to become such a world power, China is unlikely to truly become one, disproving the traditional views on our anarchical world that bigger necessitates better.   There are different international institutions that China, and the rest of the world by default, engage with, whether willingly or intentionally or unwillingly and unintentionally. In this case, it is the international institution of social media that comes closer to successfully promoting China towards the power it seeks, in tandem to contributing towards its Achilles heel [3] . Essentially, social media connects and polarises people at the same time in ways that contribute to both bettering and worsening Chinese public perception. The polarisation through hyper specific algorithms and a lack of regulation concerning prejudiced sources that promote mass fearmongering, or in fact sources that are correct but were meant to be hidden, all serve to detriment China’s image further. Yet it is this very same accessibility to information that allows for the cultural integration [4]  between Chinese media and citizens with foreigners.   The extent to which these spaces may help or hinder the country’s image depends on the comparative weight of each side. For example, the exposure of China’s less-than-charitable foreign aid intentions to developing nations such as Angola and Mozambique significantly affected trust in the region where it sought new allyship, or rather dependency, and where infrastructure built was only to support Chinese businesses and employees but hardly contributed to the nations’ development themselves [5] . Similarly protests against the government such as in Tianammen square [6]  and the Covid era that the CCP intended to silence [7]  were resurfaced through online content. Although simultaneously, the US government’s decision to ban TikTok [8]  for apparent Chinese surveillance, whether this is a true or proposed reason,  has pushed its Western audience to transfer to Red Note, its Chinese equivalent, as a form of protest. This, alongside the spread of Chinese media through famous songs [9] , comedy exploring the culture, doujin makeup and recognisable Western figures such as John Cena showing acclimation and respect to the culture [10] , which is subversive given the West’s history of assumed superiority accompanying the general imposition of the English language as the world’s language, have all benefitted foreign perceptions of China.   However, the pertaining issue is that these successes at improving China’s reputation remain largely unintentional, having been driven forward by external factors such as an opposition to the US. government, or the individuals of both nations without much political intent, rather than the government itself. This very issue has been encapsulated by the similar criticisms that arose regarding the release of the Kung Fu Panda franchise [11] , wherein Chinese cultural critics such as Zhao Bandi launched a public campaign to highlight the concern of Chinese culture being better represented by an outside country, no less an opposing force. The central issue to this is that as a result, China’s engagement to international institutions will subsequently be received with significantly lesser support than it could have been if the CCP knew how to intentionally manage their representation, to thereby finally be acknowledged and accepted on a wider scale as a status quo power, as this title relies perhaps even less on the material successes built to claim this title but more so on the willingness of other countries to accept being under China.   If the perspective of an isolated realism were taken instead, then the attitudes held by other countries toward the CCP would have no bearing. Yet, even discounting that significant factor, China would still fail to be considered a status quo power as the expansions achieved exist on a scattered or regional scale rather than as an integrated global social unit. Where forces such as the US and NATO have multiple military bases around the world, Chinese militaristic potential remains limited despite its numbers and technological advancements [12] due to the same underlying weaknesses with its ability to implement soft power diplomacy, leading to a lack of trust [13]  that makes many nations unsurprisingly unwilling to have a Chinese military base in their territory. Further, the realist movement in IR theory and practices primarily emerged during the siege of the world wars and subsequent cold war but was dismantled through the emergence of liberal institutions that prioritised cooperation over brute monopolistic dominance. Ultimately both of the aforementioned perspectives are naïve on their own, although what the latter adds to the former is the understanding that allyship is crucial, even if true allyship does not exist. What this means is that domination must not be perceived as domination in order to be effective and to maximise benefits for the long-term. Where China did exert its power in less than friendly ways, from the Belt Road Initiative [14] , to crises in the South China Sea [15] , to Tibetan monks resisting Chinese expansionism to the extent of self-immolation [16] , such aggressive expansionist policies can be traced back to its imperial history.   With the context of its history in mind, there never was any notable attempt to be or appear to be an equal contender in its interactions with international institutions. For the region of that time, which would have been the equivalent of a world organisation today due to the isolation of not only China at the time but the world from each other, a tribute system was implemented [17]  wherein neighbouring countries had to accept China as their supreme ruler and bear gifts to the Chinese emperor. And in some ways, a continued sense of isolation prevails, despite the attempts during Xiaoping’s reign to open up the country first and primarily through market reforms. The reason that market reforms did not necessarily open up the nation on a more cultural and personal level is likely due to the influences of socialism, censorship, control and the fact that it is a very different culture inherently, even if it does receive more exposure in mainstream media today.   To some extent we cannot fault the government for its control over keeping the culture separate, as in many ways it prevents a form of cultural neocolonialism that occurs where the West dominates countries through the media before having to initiate any physical measures. Thus, by displacement of the non-dominant culture and thereby non-dominant country, this allowing the domestic public of typically Western countries to support aggressive foreign policies it’s leaders may want to enact in the future against its subordinated global actors. Whereas China, being unbending in the preservation of its culture, aids in the protection of the nation to retain equal recognition.   However, yet again, this relative isolation and unbending rather than cooperative demeanour in dealings with the global order have meant that many nations are still unwilling to unify with China’s power [18]  despite the benefits that it could possibly bring. While former status quo powers such as the US also enacted aggressive policies [19] , the difference is that they were marketed much more persuasively, so that the extent to how undemocratic these were despite the key values which are promoted to enable these became less obvious or willingly ignored. In other terms, the US’ expansionist behaviour was made possible through its media which helped promote the idea of liberal democracy, that any controversial action could be converted to self-justified moralising, through the implied search and protection of peace, which led to and thus furthered this sense of allyship and greater geographical expanse of control by the US. For example, there are military bases in multiple locations around the world whereas while China also has amassed a robust military, due to its inability to cover up the less altruistic causes of most international engagement, countries would be wary to agree to a Chinese military base in their nation [20] , or any Chinese activity for that matter as seen in the protection of  Taiwan to prevent having to rely on China for semiconductor parts [21] . Therefore, despite China’s militaristic grandiosity and the other benefits it could supply such as technological advancement and labour force, it may only be considered a power but not to the degree of  acceptance as a ‘status quo’, because of this persistent hesitancy from foreign nations at large to accept China in this way.   While the country has its allies, much of this is by force and intimidation which is not only problematic in the short-term, due to the lack of consented negotiation that is expected in this essay’s contextualisation of what defines a status-quo power, but is also unsuited for the long-term due to the resentment that is likely to be developed and would easily lay the seeds of a future push-back or emphasises the vulnerability of these supposed friendships that would be lost as soon as the opportunity for a better deal presents itself. This means that China has no true allies, perhaps only obligated acquaintances or to some extent, colonies. And with colonialism, while its detrimental effects do last, the structure itself does not. In the past these were able to be established for many years and to a great extent, however they eventually fell through because of the resentment that built up over time as well as the unsustainability of one leading figure over many separate and distant nations. [22]  This means that the allyship is another facet undermining China’s ability to be a status quo power in the present as well as to sustain a larger share hold of power in the long term. Further, we live in the “End of History” which promotes the values of, or at least the appearances of, liberal democracies and humanitarian interest [23] . While we do not have the very same situation as of current, and attempts to rebuild the past have been fruitless such as Russia’s failed expansionism [24] , there are existing methods. US allies or rather its strategic dependents, remain viable despite the current world described because they accommodate its environment rather than adhere to the former world which realism still follows, as the outdated implications of this theory would suggest a country do [25] . Rather, the US or other western nations offer international institutions as a lighter and fairer, albeit still imbalanced, extension [26]  of former colonialism. Whereas China makes less of an effort to barter, reinforcing the issue that its only allies are joined out of necessity or self-preservation.   Another factor is that China plays both sides of what it should not, in the sense that the CCP makes attempts to appear friendly and then immediately disregards the constructed behaviour through openly blunt interactions with foreign nations. Though the leader Xi Jinping is relatively quiet in his cult of personality [27]  compared to his predecessors, namely Zedong, by withdrawing from public speeches, this arguably does worse for the country’s image than if it followed a Trump-inspired leadership style. It is not necessarily that the president Xi Jinping should be louder, but that his cult of personality is not clear enough due to its lack of development. Where in its policies it may seem assertive and open than it should commit to that image, in the sense that Trump’s problematic nature makes the country seem at least more consistent and authentic. Conversely, the subdued nature of China’s president could have worked in its favour but only if the policies were not mismatched. A country must be either fully loud and aggressively open, or go about ‘negotiations’ with a façade of comradery [28] , making bigger efforts to cover corrupt practices as was done in the previous eras before Trump. Although perhaps this issue could be explained due to the survival mentality where stoicism was necessary to survive China’s prime communist era [29] , as well as the continuing censorship that represses artistic and creative ability [30] . This has ultimately driven a demand for hiring foreigners to teach its humanities and more creative subjects [31] , which then holds influence on the CCP’s ability to draw inspiration on how to present and connect in a more constructivist way as the creatives were eliminated through time.   Therefore, throughout China’s past and for the trajectory of its future, the nation’s government has shown a proclivity towards overstepping the normative boundaries agreed on by international institutions. Though all global superpowers have overstepped the same boundaries, protective measures that navigated the social and behavioural aspects missed by the original realist theory were effectively applied to mitigate the consequences. Conversely, the CCP would not be able to take the same liberties due to its undiplomatic engagements with wider international institutions and an underdeveloped cultivation for its image. When all the aforementioned is applied to the context of the world at present, it seems likely that China will continue to pursue expansionist policies and prompt a reaction of the US and its alliances. While some may find this unlikely due to the West adopting an increasingly separationist view, implicated by its recent decisions to withdraw its soldiers from Afghanistan and its support towards the Ukrainian war effort against Russia, as well as some nations such as the Philippines opting to end its allyship with the US to begin with Russia instead [32] , the majority of the US’ alliances still remain firm and continue to outweigh those of China [33] . And in addition to the issue of representation, besides one being deemed more trustworthy and ‘humanitarian’ than the other, there have been several iterations that portray China as female embodiment in comparison to most countries being coded as inherently male [34] , further reinforcing its prevention from acceptance as a status quo power because of the issue that foreign media still holds greater control of China’s representation to the world. Chinese National Holiday celebrated at Tiananmen Square taken by Ecksplorer, 1st October 2022   Bibliography [1]   Christopher Layne (2006)   The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present . Cornell University Press, pp. 42–45 [Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1xx5fn ] [2]   Joseph S. Nye (2004)   Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics . 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Provo: BYU Kennedy Center [Available at: https://kennedy.byu.edu/alumni/bridges/features/art-and-politics-in-maos-china ] [30]   Solomon, Andrew (2012) Art in China: Censorship, Secrecy, and the Struggle to be Heard.  The New Yorker [Available at: https://andrewsolomon.com/articles/art-in-china/ ] [31]   Daxue Consulting (2018) Shortage of English Teachers in China: Opportunities for Foreign Educators.  Daxue Consulting [Available at: https://daxueconsulting.com/english-teachers-in-china-opportunities/ ] [32] Petty, Martin (2016) News article,  [Available at: Philippines' Duterte says China, Russia supportive when he complained of U.S. | Reuters ] [33]   Karen Lama (2024)   News article,  [Available at: Philippines confident in US alliance under Trump amid China tensions, envoy says | Reuters ] [34] Zhang, Yimai (2011)   A Cross-cultural Comparison of Gender Role Portrayal in Magazine Advertisements between China and the UK. University of Nottingham [Available at: https://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/24975 ]

“In Europe and America, there’s a growing feeling of hysteria” [1] , opens the 1985 Russians by Sting, echoing a long withstanding sentiment shared and propagated by the described nations toward any region deemed morally other, pushed in a bid to maintain their position against the threat of an anarchical world [2] . In such a world, militaristic and economic dominance is taken by one or a small few [3] , and its transference is swift if not rigidly tied. To either prevent this transference or to rise to the opportunity, nations use globalisation to cooperate or force cooperation in an era referred to as ‘The End of History’ [4] . This not only occurs within material negotiations or weighted threats, but also through an understanding of the significance of perception, whether by a country’s own public or international representation, to justify any provocative actions taken to move forward [5] .   Such provocations have been made both by the Arabic nations of the Gulf and the Western hemisphere that seeks to antagonise them. In this sense, the challenges and cultivations made toward democracy could be said to embody the pattern of a Russian doll. This is due to the external attacks made on countries in the Gulf and their subsequent internal attacks on their respective populations. Similarly, there are external motivations that influence said governments to maintain and expand on democratic values and thereby an echo of this effect on the individuals living in the nations. The specificities on the concept of democracy vary in its interpretations but is generally understood as, “government of the people, by the people, for the people” [6] , as well as, “more than a form of government… (it is) conjoint communicated experience.” [7] Therefore, the extent to which democracy may suffer or thrive depends on all factors concerning external forces to the countries’ governments, the government itself, as well as the domestic public.   One of the ways in which democracy is both challenged and cultivated by a factor concerning all of the aforementioned, is through the very structure of power itself, one such structure being imperialism. Imperialism may not only challenge the democratic freedom of its own subjects through the internal corruptions of power that are liable to any similar institution [8] , but through the threat that is posed to other countries by having a large imperial history - large in the sense that empires such as the Arab Caliphates [9]  had conquered vast expanses of land and reached similarly colonial-power status through the establishment of an Arabic slave trade. Such a history as this may further prompt Western caution [10]  towards the Arabic world because it directly contradicts the attempts of a culture to uphold its preservation as a global power through a falsely self-justifying history that claims to have always been [11] . Not only is the default history taught in many Western establishments therefore directly rivalled, but in the Arab Caliphates' expansion into regions such as North Africa, the Iberian Peninsula, and Persia showcases a history that in some cases even predates Western conquests and the cultural and scientific discoveries contributed during these expansions [12] further complicate this proposed narrative. And in opposition to the large parts of Western history where progress and breakthroughs had been lost, such as the burning of Alexandria, the Middle Ages or Dark Ages and concerns over a lack of information transference at present due to a highly individualistic culture among other factors [13] , Arabic cultural and intellectual milestones were instead mostly preserved [14] , challenging the ‘default’ narrative of global innovation and advancement. Conversely, the very same history could still be used in an opposite interpretation to inform modern Western perspectives of the Arabic world as one where the narrative of dominance and militaristic conflict, emphasised through media portrayals in the present, supports attempts to frame the region as in need of a Rosenkavalier figure to ‘guide’ the land toward democratic governance. But ultimately, the dominance that the related nations attempt to establish over past colonies does not as easily apply to the Arabic world, as from its very history it betrays the idea of a world that has been heavily implied to be inevitably Western [15] .   This power struggle is not only chiefly explained through the acceptance of a realist lens, but also a constructivist one, as the purpose of self-justified dominance is not only to establish permission from other countries but quite significantly, its own public [16] , in order to later justify aggressive foreign policies taken. These attempts were successful in the ‘freedom’ wars and attacks on terrorism [17] , which consequently challenged the practice of democracy in the involved countries, such as Iran and Iraq, first initiated by external forces and having a trickle-down effect. This was demonstrated through the United States’ justification for the Iraq War in 2003 wherein the nation relied heavily on a narrative of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in order to appeal to its public, by using realist-constructivist techniques to frame the war as a necessity for security concerns, the safety of the nation, the nation first and foremost. This unification against an ambiguous and foreign enemy was not only later discovered to be baseless, but unbeknownst to the wider public had already been disproved and known by significant figures at the time to be baseless [18] . This is because, even prior to the planted evidence the want for intervention had risen highly enough that it was only a matter of waiting for the right terminology and phrases to employ. Thus is the importance of also recognising the relevance of the constructivist lens in determining large scale actions taken as well as the individuals on a more micro level, because the images created to sell the 'freedom wars' not only self-justified through seemingly logical decision-making but imbued a sense of moral superiority despite the destabilisation and subsequent democratic regressions the intervention later caused. For instance, in Iraq, the denigration of Saddam Hussein's regime led to a largely fractured, sectarian political structure, with constant challenges concerning democratic governance due to the internal instability worsened by external interference. Similarly, in Iran, sanctions and international pressure arguably led to the reinforcement of authoritarian practices under the facade of simply resisting foreign imperialism [19] . Further, the emergence of groups such as ISIS, catalysed by the chaos left behind, added to the erosion for the chances of a stable and democratic governance to develop. In this sense, imperialism has the capacity to draw external challenges by furthering the perception of the named countries and related region as a threat, and the resulting turmoil has had long-term impacts on the governments and individuals’ ability to live a democratic life in the aftermath of the events [20] .   For some essayists, a strong monarchical rule has the potential, albeit often misused, to aid the cultivation of democracy by maintaining peace and stability, meaning externally-induced political turmoil is unlikely to be a factor in its prevention or collapse [21] . And as a result of the hypothetical stability provided, people are assumed to be more likely to have their needs met and thereby also live ‘a democratic lifestyle’ [22]  in addition to the implied protection from external threats to their democracy. An example for the protective value of a monarchical system is Oman, which is consistently regarded as one of the most peaceful nations both in its region and worldwide [23] . However, while seemingly praised for its system, Oman has also been questioned for its limitations on public participation in its political concerns [24] . The key issue is that the Sultan retains ultimate authority, where the elected Consultative Assembly may only propose suggestions, rather than function as a republic might be expected to in its image. The peaceful reputation of this country, however, is further amplified when contrasted with nearby nations such as Yemen, where ongoing conflict and instability have severely undermined any prospect of democratic governance, further solidifying the image of Oman as an ideal despite its contested flaws. For example, the stability of the country has not guaranteed truly democratic freedoms, as there are restrictions maintained on individual and press freedom of speech, with censorship and arrests being used often to dissolve any dissent. [25]  Therefore, perhaps much of what is permitted is not necessarily due to the monarchy acting as a harbinger of peace, but rather due to the comparative politics of more overtly conflicted nations, whereby the grave limitations of its neighbouring countries lead to the undervaluing and dismissal of the issues that exist in countries like Oman concerning its democracy.   The system of governance described has also been a challenge to internal democracy with more blatant demonstrations. For example, while the Iranian Shah initially set out to form a republic with ‘democratic’ [26]  values, his rule still serves as an example of the damage a monarchist can inflict on their subjects, such as the suppression of political opposition, the use of secret police (SAVAK) for both intimidation purposes as well as to genuinely threaten, and the restrictions again on press freedom; all initial intentions towards goodwill and democracy left after the influence of British persuasion for the façade of increased domination [27] in exchange for oil. Alternatively, it may be possible that a certain abuse of power was likely to occur regardless, although the impact of an externally fed profit motive remains significant in this case [28] . Ultimately, the context reinforces the pattern of a Russian doll in the exploitation that comes from an external source then continues to have its echoes. Through the overtly imbalanced distribution of power that a monarchy presents, and thereby easily turns autocratic, the people themselves begin to experience fewer personal freedoms [29]  until the drastic concentration of power provokes backlash such as the 1979 Iranian Revolution and later 2010-2011 Arab Spring uprisings.   In the Arab Spring uprisings, it was reported that monarchies faced much less upheaval than republics, with their leadership staying relatively constant [30] . Some countries had at certain points been able to provoke their ruler into fleeing the country, however these effects lacked permanence when within a few years much of these overthrown systems had been restored. One of such examples was in Yemen, where the President Ali Abdullah Saleh was overthrown, but after his removal ensued a prolonged civil war, which disillusioned the earlier drive that had initially propelled the Arab Spring uprisings, due to struggles toward achieving any enduring systemic change [31] . The contrast portrays how monarchies, perhaps due to heavier restrictions and upholding the idea of one leader above all other people, seemed less affected by the upheaval than republic societies. Some of these monarchies did become less rigid in their governance through the aftermath, such as Saudi Arabia in its reforms to allow women to drive [32] , though a greater factor in this change seems to be profit incentive rather than any moral one. For example, despite facing international scrutiny regarding the Sudanese coup against a rising democratic transition, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, continued to fund its military. Their backing towards the military junta was seen as prioritising the protection of personal interests over the advancement of democratic values [33] . Saudi Arabia had similarly given its support towards the General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi's governance in Egypt, providing billions in aid to ensure alignment with Saudi policies, despite human rights controversies [34] . Ultimately, the extent to which democracy in the aforementioned countries are primarily challenged or cultivated by structures of power depends more so on the incentive, where if peace and democracy happens to be profitable then it will be sought, but if not then discarded.   While both monarchies and republican societies have equal or similar abilities to be converted into autocratic regimes, it could in fact be argued that an autocratic republic may threaten democracy even more so than the monarchical equivalent. This has been proven in various ways, one being the aforementioned Arab Spring uprising where while republics were able to face greater change, this also led to extended instability in the regions meaning that the individuals’ direct ability to experience even the most basic freedoms faced challenges for much longer and is arguably more detrimental to the long-term development of democracy, because it has set an example that protest does not always lead to the desired outcome [35] , and discouraging attempts to try for progress again. Similarly, the Iranian revolution did not lead to the desired outcome and in Persepolis it is explored in further detail that it created a sentiment where “people were tired of fighting and wanted to put the talk behind them, even if it meant trading their rights away”. Similarly, the conflicts that ensued in neighbouring countries after attempts at activism, such as Gadhafi’s regime in Libya and the Syrian conflict, while not Arabic Gulf nations themselves, reinforce a preventative mindset towards progress by its events. [36]  This echoes the Iranian Revolution's aftermath, where hopes for democracy were overshadowed by the establishment of the following regime [37] . Again, as depicted in Persepolis , the individuals of the nation were compelled to abandoned their aspirations for freedom to prioritise survival, an autocratic culture that essentially advances and compounds on itself [38] .   Another way in which an autocratic republic may pose a greater challenge to democracy is due to the false pretence where it is able to establish some limited freedoms in which, because the issue of democracy or non-democratic values are less directly evident, it is inherently more difficult and perhaps even more uninviting to attempt to disrupt the system of governance. Especially when underscored with the threat of nearby countries facing what appears to be much worse, the individual is forced to be grateful in order to not lose what relative privileges remain. The issue with this, however, is that the extent to which a nation is democratic or not should not be argued using comparative politics. This is because it dismisses the struggles that take place within a country in its own right. Whether one nation appears more free or less free than another, it would be more objective to consider the very individual facets of each in their own right. It is in fact that this way of thinking has been used harmfully to suggest that it is acceptable to fund specific countries for personal goals and simply dismiss or infiltrate others at will. As seen on the Freedom House source [39] , some factors for ranking the presence of democracy across countries seem to intentionally favour the Western hemisphere not only in outcome but in the very basis of its ranking. For instance, besides the surreal and slightly dystopian nature of assigning various countries ‘freedom points’ to determine their rank, some ways in which the points are assigned are not necessarily indicative of said relative freedoms. [40] In some ways this resembles the prior issue of the freedom wars and framed attacks on terrorism, where perhaps it would be beneficial to draw attention to the lack of democracy in other countries such as the Gulf, or even additionally maintain its repression, to distract from the West’s internal and external issues with democracy [41] . Further, the tendency to compare nations rather than critically evaluate them individually has enabled the Western powers in question to maintain support for certain regimes such as Bahrain, using their suggested stability to reason their continued arms sales and political backing, despite overt human rights violations. [42]  Essentially, it is this mindset not only fails to hold these nations accountable but also reinforces a system of global power dynamics that favours certain interests at the expense of democratic establishment.   Additionally, these latter institutions are more likely to be open to other countries than monarchies, which has the potential to instead further the detriments on democratic freedoms by having greater connection to and capacity to be influenced by, the very same external forces that have fuelled civil unrest in the regions. Where an oppressive monarchy offers corruption in a single concentrated source, the nature of a republic allows it to join the republics of other countries in an increased repression as these forces amalgamate and continue to have rippling effects [43]  through subchannels of forced ‘cooperation’ [44] , trade agreements, military alliances. It is these pressures from foreign governments, which can be used to interfere with their internal politics to maintain favourable conditions for the Western party’s interests, that complicate governance and eventually dilute the focus on internal democratic values. In these suggested ways, an autocratic republic may thereby exert an even greater restraint on democracy than a monarchy, as it creates a more ambiguous system of governance [45]  where internal dissent is not only supressed internally but undermined externally. Therefore, in all the aforementioned ways an autocratic republic may be capable of doing worse to restrain the progression of a democratic society.   Another factor of governance or perhaps even a form of governance in itself is the media combined with religion in its usage. It is a controversial medium to exist in autocratic states, or any state in the world for that matter as there are very few true democracies [46] , due to the balancing act between allowing some space for creativity, entertainment, informational discovery, as well as monitoring for anything that may require censorship. Issues of censorship have been raised with the Qatari government-funded Al Jazeera, which, while initially praised for its reporting and conversely condemned by the US for its more humanising portrayal of its opposition [47] , the news source could no longer maintain the same trust when the internally organised deaths of some key reporters were later revealed. One critical issue with this, is that it is usually within the interests of autocratic or near-autocratic nations to perform these acts of censorship discreetly, because fear has the potential to gradually build resentment. A certain degree of tension is similarly echoed in conflicting cultural expressions. Where sectarianism maintains divisions against the rise of democracy on a larger scale by creating smaller enemies for diversion, certain sects such as Sufism are particularly at odds, as well as in tandem with, wider cultural aspects that countries in the Arabic Gulf share in common. For example, Sufism has made significant large-scale contributions to Arabic poetry and literature where the imagery involved, particularly from figures such as Rumi or Hafiz, often refer to metaphors of intimacy, wine and at times suggestive themes to describe an intensity of divine love and union in ways that would otherwise seem taboo and in contrast to rigid social norms enforced by the regimes. The mystical and highly personal nature of the branch also encourages a wide range of practices and expressions, the individualism of which is again at odds with the regimes’ practices. It is also the ability to be creative that is consistently linked with an increased capacity for rebellion [48] - often a necessary tool to further cultivate democracy. Similarly, music videos and other forms of media reveal a complex dynamic in countries that otherwise seem to maintain conservative values despite greater variation of choice presented otherwise, for example, popular music videos from the region and in the languages may feature women without the hijab, as well as with. One reason for this conflict may be due to the subjective and transformative nature of Islam itself. Where many autocracies in the Arabic Gulf are also theocracies, the religion and how governments choose to interpret the Quran, Sunnah or the Prophet Mohammad, will significantly vary. On another level, the physical expression of the belief system chosen by the respective governments may be affected by globalisation. Although, while globalisation may encourage liberal democracy, it may also operate as a system of political dominance and subsequent cultural dominance. For some the effect has been described as ‘invasive’ [49] , prompting defensive reactions such as the rise of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia, conflicting with the country’s proposed aims to ‘open’.     Seemingly, however, there is a distance that remains between the Arabic Gulf and it’s the external world that commonly stands in opposition. Through maintaining a staunchly separate identity in presentation and speeches delivered [50] , the governing figures of the Arabic Gulf ensure its citizens are perceived as a separate entity to the outside world under the guise of cultural preservation. Through this manner, when further news coverage is televised about present and future corruptions taking place, the citizens of the Western nations, perhaps with the exception of the younger generations due to social media access which allows news coverage and cultural sharing on a more personal level [51] , are less likely to feel as much of a moral urge to push their governments to enact another ‘freedom’ war, leaving the regimes mostly to their own devices and opting to establish a comfortably distant allyship with countries such as the US [52] . Another way that distance is potentially maintained to avoid confronting democratic concerns is through the role of women. While many interpretations of the original religion seem to advocate for women, an undue focus on this can easily overlap with victim blaming mentalities that could be used to support an autocratic environment [53] . By politicising the female body, and drastically affecting its appearance through the symbolic uniform prescribed [54] , the women of the opposite hemispheres seem even more separate, and by consequence so are the people as a whole. Further, by controlling a significant portion of the population, and convincing another significant portion that this treatment is necessary, it again plays into the aforementioned idea of creating internal divisions and smaller enemies to prevent the fruition of a democratic state.   While attempts have been made through Western feminism to confront this distance and promote democratic values, it has only aggravated the underlying separation in question. This is because of the flaws within western feminism that has led to previous failures to unite different cultural groups and the fact that western feminism is ultimately western before it is feminist. The issues pertaining to this include an unwillingness to be flexible in understanding other cultures, or being too overly accepting of all choices and ways of being even if some go against the values advocated for [55] , also the sexual liberation movement which stands in stark contrast to the more conservative values adopted within the Gulf, previous advocacy for the movement having been associated in with lobbyist behaviour [56]  or in less extreme cases, generally hearkening an image of travelling missionaries with a white saviour complex [57]  and biases unbeknownst to them that continue to feed into the Russian doll. First separated by larger governmental structures then a pattern that continues to repeat [58]  on smaller, diminishing levels, preventing the influence of foreign ideologies to encourage internal calls for democracy even while many of the Gulf states become increasingly open to other nations for its economic and soft power interests.   In an alternative view to much of the above, there have been notable attempts to further the progress of democracy in the Arab Gulf. Case studies include Kuwait, where it’s National Assembly is considered one of the most democratic parliaments in the region, as there is a degree of legislative and oversight power that is allowed. Whereas Bahrain and Oman established consultative councils to grant citizens participation in legislative discussions, though still with restrictions [59] . While national-level democracy may face restraints, local governance still allows for the ability of its people to participate. One of such ways includes majlis (traditional councils) which allows citizens to voice their concerns and have an influence on local decisions. On a larger scale, Gulf countries have been increasingly integrated into global markets and organisations such as the WTO and UN, the interactions of which encourage legal reforms to meet international standards, especially concerning human rights legislation [60] . In a similar vein, programs such as Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 [61]  have made efforts to increase the country’s soft power in a bid to open up the country socially and politically to maximise both its oil revenue and other forms of profit such as tourism, paving the way for democratic ideals to take root. It is a benefit to see the beginnings of democratic rule, although the extent to which this continues to develop and expand remains highly questionable. [62]  Rather it seems that only a certain limit of democratic ideals would ever be allowed if it serves in the economic interests of the country itself and its supervisor [63]  countries. Otherwise, if authority begins to face real challenges than it appears likely to all be reverted according to the inability of prior movements to maintain the degree of revolution sought. [64]   The tension between democratic ideals and the interests of those who benefit from authoritarian structures in the Arabic Gulf presents the possibility of freedom, transparency, and the protection of individual rights; yet, on the other, its presence may also threaten the stability or lack thereof that enables imbalanced power structures to thrive. These structures often tolerate some elements of democracy but rather as a tool to navigate external pressures and preserve economic interests, through which the very concept of democracy and its ability to genuinely prosper become ambiguous. This is then compounded by the psychological and political aspects of a historical and ongoing trauma where the effects of conflict, and the physical presence of US and British forces has only deepened this impending sense of external threat, further exacerbated by the West’s concerns of new global powers rising [65] . Yet, democracy, while heavily challenged by both internal and external forces, whether foreign governments, internal or through reactionary movements by the citizens such as Wahhabism in response to the aforementioned, can never be fully erased. Even when repressed, its cultivation does not entirely end but progresses at a slower, more fragmented pace, the seeds of which have particularly taken to the growing youth populations, many of whom are increasingly educated, connected to the world through social media, and prepared to advocate for democratic freedoms —evidenced in recent cases such as Iran's protests over the hijab [66] . These shifts essentially indicate an increased political awareness and desire for reform. Then the paradox of being a part of largely collectivist cultures may initially challenge democratic values, due to emphasis on conformity over individualism, they may also strengthen democratic ideals instead. This is because of the promotion of unity and standing in solidarity whereas in individualistic societies, people are more likely to act in isolation or to preserve their own needs above the needs of a wider group, often failing to harness the momentum needed to confront on a more effective level [67] . In this sense, while democracy may struggle initially to find lasting permanence in the Arabic Gulf, the inherent collectivism of its societies could eventually propel it forward [68] . And even in its seeming failures or reversals through time [69] , history has illustrated that even the smallest steps taken still contribute towards a broader cultural transition. Just as the written manuscripts in The   Master and Margarita  refuse to burn [70] , the push for democracy, once initiated, continues to develop in less overt ways, even when faced with push-back from all layers of the Russian doll. British Prime Minister sat with the Sultan of Oman taken by the Oman News Agency, January 2020   Bibliography [1]  Sting (1985) Russians . [Accessible at: https://genius.com/Sting-russians-lyrics ] [2]  Edward W. Said (1978) Orientalism . New York: Pantheon Books, pp. 31-37. [Accessible at: https://archive.org/details/orientalism00said ] [3]  Paul Kennedy (1987) The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 . New York: Random House, pp. 3-14. [Accessible at: https://archive.org/details/risefallgreatpow00ken ] [4]  Francis Fukuyama (1992) The End of History and the Last Man . New York: Free Press, pp. 1-20. [Accessible at: https://archive.org/details/endofhistorylast0000fuku ] [5]  Joseph S. 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The inciting incident for modern warfare is often attributed to the Crimean War [1] , which accelerated Harvey’s time-space compression [2]  with the invention of the telegraph, exacerbated by advancements in nuclear and cyber warfare, underscored by globalisation. These developments, alongside institutional failures, have heightened the moral ambiguities of war until it no longer “determine(s) who is right — only who is left.” [3]  Consequently, it might be logical to assume that the modern civilian holds an anti-war stance, a sentiment frequently echoed in today's media since its Renaissance [4] . However, though war may no longer be naturalised [5] , the modern civilian does not entirely oppose it. While the erosion of traditional methods that once strengthened civil-military relations, ('invisible communities,' nationalism, religion) along with technological advancements fostering greater awareness of the realities of war and its corruption, has strained CMR, the inundation of information dilutes these moral disagreements. Some desensitised individuals may adopt a more positive outlook on warfare and thereby the military due to moral distance, 'The Descent of Man' [6] , and the search for meaning to replace its former placeholders, most notable and long withstanding of which had been religion. Meanwhile genuine activist efforts remain marginalised due to political apathy or punitive measures [7] . Thus, modern warfare has severed CMR. Although some can harbour an unconscious acceptance of war, this no longer stems from its naturalisation, but what we will refer to as its ‘normalisation’, where information moves fast, the world in its entirety moves fast, and as such, we are compelled to keep moving on. A significant impact of modern warfare on CMR is the advancement of communication [8] , defined through transmission or ritual. The former connects to Harvey’s time-space compression on the beginnings of a “voracious public appetite for the immediacy of telegraphed news” [9]  developing into desensitisation. Whereas the latter foreshadows the erosion of invisible communities [10] . This transformation is exemplified by The Charge of the Light Brigade [11]  and Enthusiasm of Paterfamilias [12] , circulated by contemporary national news [13]  to portray the shift from romanticising soldiers, figures of national heroism, to focus on war’s injustices . A gendered difference in this perception is also depicted in the women’s faces compared to the animated Paterfamilias , articulated in Perry’s ‘Descent of Man’ [14]  and supported by increasing disparities [15]  in political views [16] . Consequently, military reverence has diminished overall, though associations of war with masculinity suggests male and female civilians will experience this separation differently. Later advancements in communication would further civilian mistrust towards the military through biased war-reporting, for example, “show(ing) the Blitz… represented as indiscriminate terrorism against innocent civilians… by its ability to show the effects of bombing on the ground: the viewpoint was… those crouching beneath the bombs. But when the same newsreels covered the Allied bombing of German cities like Cologne or Hamburg, the reports were, of equal necessity, all from above: their viewpoint shared with the bombers… ‘Much damage of military importance was done.” [17]  Similarly the BBC, due to government ties to Israel, reported Israelis being ‘killed’, ‘murdered’, even ‘brutally murdered’, while in comparison, Palestinians simply ‘died’ [18] . Consequently, the commodification of news [19]   and the alignment of military reporting with government agendas undermines public confidence in both institutions. Further regarding authoritative mistrust, modern warfare, driven by technological advancements, has transformed CMR by heightening awareness of corruption and conditions of war. Additionally, these advancements have escalated the threat of destruction, shifting casualties from ‘distant’ soldiers to civilians. Examples include the development of nuclear warfare during the Cold War, which not only raised concerns about the longer-term magnitude of destruction but also its immediacy, as previously seen in the decimation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki [20] . Similarly, the War on Terror [21] intensified insecurities about the military's ability to protect its citizens due to the evolving nature of conflict. Considering the insecurity exacerbated by time-space compression in modern warfare, which destabilises former institutions and heightens awareness of military errors, civilians are not only distrustful of, but even antagonised by, the military. Despite expectations that the military should prioritise its population's interests, historical events such as the Red Scare demonstrate otherwise [22] . Further instances of the military turning against its civilians have recurred throughout history, under the regimes of Pinochet, the Kim dynasty, Putin, and during the Tiananmen Square massacre, all cases in which the military acted as ‘key supporters’ [23] for tyranny. Moreover, while the ruination of those returning from war could previously be obscured by victory [24] , the Vietnam war was widely regarded as futile, subsequently exposing the ‘disregard’ [25] of returning veterans as not much more than pawns, to much greater extents (even now, cases of soldiers being discharged without warning and facing structural unemployment [26]  has only re-affirmed this view). Increasing awareness at the time could be seen in shifting media depictions of the cinematic protagonist from the archetypal hero to antiheroes, such as Randle McMurphy [27] or Travis Bickle [28] , among others [29] , all depicted returning veterans struggling to navigate post-war life due to flaws or obstacles prompted by the effects of war. Therefore, modern warfare has altered CMR through the increased awareness of corruption which has caused civilian distrust of the military, furthered by the growing threat of destruction through advancements in weaponry, and underscored by repeated instances of military aggression against its own civilians. The civilian's disillusionment continues to persist into the 21st century, fuelled by the rapidly evolving nature of warfare. This evolution not only destabilises institutions, resulting in flawed or ineffective decision-making (for example, the increased urgency for cybersecurity [30]  and its resulting insecurities [31] , or the United Nations during the Rwandan and Bosnian Genocides [32] ) but also necessitates a reassessment of the effectiveness of military strategy as a whole. The proliferation of advanced weaponry, exemplified by nuclear and cyber warfare, alongside increasing interconnectedness in trade and culture (diminishing nationalism and thereby posing a greater challenge in civilians to justify war through perceptions of ‘the other’) concludes that the prospect of a third world war would mean destruction of a magnitude that benefits no one.  These escalating stakes underscore the need for preventive measures, notably soft diplomacy, which is increasingly supported by public opinion as evidenced in its calls for reduced military spending [33] . Thus, CMR has also diminished as the military is no longer viewed as advantageous as in former years, due to its post-war treatment of those who served, as well as changes in modern warfare that have emphasised an increasing urgency for preventative measures such as soft diplomacy over military strategy. To conclude, modern warfare primarily altered CMR through advancements in communication that exposed corruption, and weaponry which has escalated the stakes of conflict, the increasingly connected landscape of which challenges the relevancy of military action when preventative measures are preferable. Moreover, gendered differences in attitudes towards war and the modern man's desire to achieve its re-glorification [34] , prompt additional questions on the future of CMR. These emerging dynamics underscore the significance of addressing not only the immediate consequences of modern warfare, but its long-term ramifications. Perhaps, rather than attempting to ‘correct’ the public opinion of the military, as some recruitment services aim to do [35] , the military should not only be concerned with war but more directly serve its civilians through the deployment of military services during natural disasters, rescue operations, medical assistance, food and humanitarian relief, as similarly to the way in which ‘manuscripts don’t burn’ [36] , neither do the events of history, despite attempts to ignore, rewrite or ‘correct’. Rather, the civilian’s distrust through time simply has to be acknowledged and the military must adapt accordingly.   Footage of the Kentucky Derby Protests taken by The Courier Journal, 6th September 2020   Bibliography [1]  Claim supported by the start of the fourth paragraph in ‘The Crimean War’, National Park Service, 4th August 2022 < The Crimean War (U.S. National Park Service) ( nps.gov ) > [accessed 18th March 2024] [2]  Concept explained in the abstract of Peter Kivisto, ‘Time-Space Compression’, Wiley Online Library, 29th February 2012 < https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470670590.wbeog557 > [accessed 18th March 2024] [3]  Famous quote used to reflect modern views on war as explored by Mindscape, “War doesn’t determine who is right- only who is left, Medium, 4th October 2023 < “War doesnt determine who is right — only who is left” | by Mindscape | Medium > [accessed 18th March 2024]                               [4]  The Hollywood Renaissance faced the emergence of antiheroes over traditionally chivalrous protagonists, ‘the inverted John Wayne figure’, due to the disillusionment of former national heroism in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, Peter C. Rollins, ‘The Vietnam War: Perceptions Through Literature, Film, and Television’, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 36, No. 3 (1984) pp. 1,4, 8-9, doi :   https://doi.org/10.2307/2712741 [5] This would explain previously passive acceptance of war, but through its falsification is no longer as relevant to explaining unconscious war-acceptance today, see 1:09 to 4:08 of Wisecrack, ‘Why Humanity Turns to War’, YouTube, 18th April 2022 < Why Humanity Turns to War - YouTube > [accessed 18th March 2024] [6]  Grayson Perry, The Descent of Man, Penguin books (2016) [7]  Despite peacefully protesting, activists still face the threat of violence enacted by authority and its military forces to limit the protester’s ability to enact change, ‘Protect the Protest’, Amnesty International, 2023¸< Right to protest - Amnesty International > [accessed 18th March 2024] [8]  In this lecture, two definitions of communication are explored and applied to the context of the Crimean war Dr Whyte, ‘Communication and War’, I.R.100/L02/01/W18 : International Relations: Theory and Practice, Lancaster University (March 2023) see 27:52 to 30:35 I.R.100/L02/01/W18 ( panopto.eu ) [9]  Derek Gregory, “Deadly Embrace – War, distance and intimacy”, International Geographical Congress, (2012) p.2, Gregory - Deadly Embrace .pdf [10]  Loss of invisible communities through the telegraph’s invention and established beginnings of a slow decline in nationalism, Dr Whyte, ‘Communication and War’, see 33:20 to 34:50 I.R.100/L02/01/W18 ( panopto.eu ) [11]  Alfred Lord Tennyson, The Charge of the Light Brigade, The Examiner (1854) [12]  The man holds his stick as though he too were one of the soldiers, the soldier is gradually seen as an individual beyond its symbolism of national heroism, Enthusiasm of Paterfamilias, 1854, print, 5057x3741/18.1MB, John Leech Cartoons from Punch magazine | PUNCH Magazine Cartoon Archive [13]  BNA, ‘’Charge of the Light Cavalry Brigade – the Battle of Balaclava , 25 October 1854’, The British Newspaper Archive, 24th October 2013 < The British Newspaper Archive Blog ‘Charge of the Light Cavalry Brigade’ – the Battle of Balaclava, 25 October 1854 | The British Newspaper Archive Blog > [14]  Differing expectations and experiences of masculinity versus femininity lead to different views on war, with a sense of nostalgia and overall positive outlook for the modern man made more apparent than for women, ‘For many young men today, being a man is to be like one of those Japanese soldiers emerging from the jungle, still fighting after the war was long over… conditioned to be something that is no longer needed’, ‘national service was the last time we had a formalised coming-of-age ritual for young men… it was a time of re-parenting’, Grayson Perry, The Descent of Man, pp. 78, 87 [15]  Dr Rosalind Shorrocks, ‘The gender divide in British politics’, UK in a Changing Europe, 8th March 2022 < The gender divide in British politics - UK in a changing Europe ( ukandeu.ac.uk ) > [accessed 18th March 2024] [16]  ‘The Growing Political Divide Between Young Men and Women’, Survey Centre on American Life, 31st May 2022 < The Growing Political Divide Between Young Men and Women - The Survey Center on American Life ( americansurveycenter.org ) > [accessed 18th March 2024] [17]  Gregory, “Deadly Embrace – War, distance and intimacy”, p.4 [18]  Xander Elliards, ‘Study shows BBC bias in reporting on Palestinian and Israeli deaths, The National (9th January 2024) < Study shows BBC 'bias' in reporting on Palestinian and Israeli deaths | The National > [accessed 19th March 2023] [19]  Greg McLaughlin, ‘From Luckless Tribe to Wireless Tribe: The Impact of Media Technologies on War Reporting’, Pluto Press (2016) pp. 65-66, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt19qgf0x.8 [20]  Destruction of warfare and its increased proximity to the civilian despite them being at home, away from battlefields, and the impacts would run deeper than anticipated, Robert Rizzo, ‘The Psychological Illusions of Nuclear Warfare’, University of North Carolina Press, 33. No. 3 , (1983) https://www.jstor.org/stable/24458674 [21]  Every new conflict creates a level of uncertainty in the general public about the efficacy of its leaders, John Mueller, ‘PUBLIC OPINION ON WAR AND TERROR: MANIPULATED OR MANIPULATING?’, Cato Institute (2021) https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep33745.5 [22]  The Red Scare was also referred to as a period of mass hysteria, where the perceived threat of Communism was fearmongered by the government to target suspected (or simply labelled) individuals and maintain this oppression through militia, Stuart J. Foster, ‘Chapter 1: The Red Scare: Origins and Impact’, Peter Lang AG, 87, (2000) p.6 https://www.jstor.org/stable/42976159 [23]  The role of the military as a key supporter for dictatorships, see 0:44 to 1:36 of CGP Grey, ‘Rules for Rulers’, YouTube, 24th October 2016, < The Rules for Rulers ( youtube.com ) > [accessed 18th March 2024] [24]  The aftermath of WW1 would have been afflicting; however, this is overshadowed by the war’s victory, and as such, anti-war sentiments are not yet as strong, Michael Roper, ‘ Between Manliness and Masculinity: The “War Generation” and the Psychology of Fear in Britain, 1914–1950’, Cambridge University Press, 44, No.2, (2005) pg. 2, doi:   https://doi-org.ezproxy.lancs.ac.uk/10.1086/427130 [25]  Simon Hall, ‘The Response of the Moderate Wing of the Civil Rights Movement to the War in Vietnam’, Cambridge University Press, 46, No. 3, (2003) https://www.jstor.org/stable/3133567 [26]  See abstract, Alair Maclean, ‘The Things They Carry: Combat, Disability, and Unemployment among U.S. Men’, American Sociological Review, 75, No. 4, (2010) The Things They Carry: Combat, Disability, and Unemployment among U.S. Men1 - Alair MacLean, 2010 ( sagepub.com ) [accessed 18th March 2023] [27]  Randle McMurphy: a war hero incriminated for insubordination, despite it saving lives. Continued challenges to authority lead to institutionalisation. The ward: a microcosm for fear-based oppression in McCarthyistic America. Most patients do not need to be there, but lack choice due to marginalisation for their differences (in thought, behaviour, or race). Randle is not a complete hero, as revealed in thoughts and actions towards women, but protects the rights of others. Ken Kesey, One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest,  Penguin Classics (2005) [28]  Travis Bickle: unable to reconnect with society after the war, he takes on superficially moral quests to feel re-purposed. First: assassination attempt of a President without much political knowledge or awareness of his policies. Then: kills the pimp of a young girl for news articles to shape him as a hero. Although last frames convey a lack of resolution and foreboding in this character. Paul Schrader, Taxi Driver, Faber and Faber (1990) [29]  Mario Puzo, The Godfather, G.P. Putnam and Sons (1967) [30]  Elaine Korzak, ‘UN GGE on Cybersecurity: The End of an Era?’, The Diplomat, 31st July 2017,   < UN GGE on Cybersecurity: The End of an Era? – The Diplomat > [accessed 18th March 2024] [31]  ‘The Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox’, Diplomacy, 2023, < The EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox ( cyber-diplomacy-toolbox.com ) > [accessed 19th March 2024] [32]  Cooper Scherr, ‘Why the United Nations Cannot Stop Genocide’, Santa Clara University, 23, No.14, (2019) pp. 1-10 https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1171&context=historical-perspectives [33]  ‘Eight reasons why UK military spending shouldn’t be increased’, SGR, 10th March 2023, < Eight reasons why UK military spending shouldn’t be increased | SGR: Responsible Science > [accessed 19th March 2024] [34]  Searches of war edits would reveal a growing counterculture of young men romanticising war, Travis Grey, ‘Ukraine Will Be Russia’, YouTube, 26th February 2024, < UKRAINE WILL BE RUSSIA - Russian Army Edit | KSLV NOH - OVERRIDE ( youtube.com ) > [accessed 19th March 2024] [35]  For example, here it is assumed that there is something to be fixed in the newer generation, when the focus should be on reacting to former issues in the military that have led to the depreciation of its reputation, see timestamp as well as top comments, MSNBC, ‘U.S. Military faces a recruiting crisis; service member offers solutions to change that’, YouTube (8th September 2023) < U.S. Military faces a recruiting crisis; service member offers solutions to change that ( youtube.com ) > [36] Mikhail Bulgakov, The Master and Margarita, YMCA Press   (1967) Ch. 24